

Secretary Vance

# U.S. Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy

March 27, 1980

United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.



*Following is a statement by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1980.*

I welcome the opportunity to join with you in looking beyond immediate events to America's overall posture and purposes in the world.

For the past 4 months, our primary concern has been drawn to an area of immediate crisis—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Terrorism in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan have required concentrated attention. But even as we address these current challenges, we must constantly place our response to specific events within our broader strategy. Our present actions must not only meet immediate crises; they must advance our long-term interests as well.

Over the past several years I have met with the committee many times on specific elements of our foreign policy. These hearings offer an opportunity to consider America's wide-ranging interests, how they relate to each other, and our overall course.

I hope these hearings can also serve another purpose: to help crystallize broad agreement on the general course that best suits America's interests and needs in the coming decade.

I do not suggest that a full consensus behind a detailed foreign policy is now likely. In a world of extraordinary and growing complexity, a world in which our interests are diverse, we cannot escape choices which in their nature are the stuff of controversy.

But I do believe that despite differ-

ences on decisions that we have made and that we and others will make during the 1980s, our nation can now shape a new foreign policy consensus about our goals in the world and the essential strands of our strategy to pursue them.

This consensus can be built around agreement on two central points.

- First, the United States must maintain a military balance of power. Our defense forces must remain unsurpassed. Our strategic deterrent must be unquestionable. Our conventional forces must be strong enough and flexible enough to meet the full range of military threats we may face. As a global power, we must maintain the global military balance. Our strength is important to our own safety, to a strong foreign policy free from coercion, to the confidence of allies and friends, and to the future of reciprocal arms control and other negotiations. Our strength also buttresses regional balances that could be upset by the direct or indirect use of Soviet power.

- The second central point is this: that our military strength, while an essential condition for an effective foreign policy, is not in itself a sufficient condition. We must nurture and draw upon our other strengths as well—our alliances and other international ties, our economic resources, our ability to deal with diversity, and our ideals. By drawing fully on these strengths, we can help shape world events now in ways that reduce the likelihood of using military force later. A global American foreign policy can succeed only if it has both these dimensions.

Some have argued that a strong response to Soviet military growth and aggression is overreaction. But to disregard the growth of Soviet military programs and budgets or to explain away aggression as a defensive maneuver is to take refuge in illusion.

It is just as illusory, and just as dangerous, to believe that there can be a fortress America or that the world will follow our lead solely because of our military strength. America's future depends not only on our growing military power; it also requires the continued pursuit of energy security and arms control, of human rights and economic development abroad.

As we look to the 1980s, our first obligation is to see the world clearly. We confront a serious and sustained Soviet challenge, which is both military and political. Their military buildup continues unabated. The Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to employ that power directly and through others. In that sense, Afghanistan is a manifestation of a larger problem, evident also in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

The world economic order is undergoing dramatic change. An energy crisis has rocked its foundations. Economic interdependence has become a daily reality for the citizens of every nation. At the same time, the assertion of national independence has reshaped the political geography of the planet. There are a profusion of different systems and allegiances and a diffusion of political and military power. Within nations, we see an accelerating rise in individual expectations.

These challenges require a full American engagement in the world—a resolve to defend our vital interests with force if necessary and to address potential causes of conflict before they erupt. These hearings can help illuminate how best to order and serve the wide range of interests we have in a world grown increasingly complex.

In my remarks today, I will discuss eight central American interests for the coming years. Each is broad in its own terms. But I do not believe that any of these interests can be narrowed, much less disregarded, without doing damage to the others.

- Our most basic interest, and first priority, is the physical security of our nation—the safety of our people. This requires strong defense forces and strong alliances.

- It also requires that we and our allies firmly and carefully manage a second area of concern: East-West relations.

- A third interest—controlling the growth and spread of nuclear and other

weapons—enhances our collective security and international stability.

- Fourth, we must confront the global energy crisis and strengthen the international economy, for doing so is central to our well-being as a people and our strength as a nation.

- A fifth interest, peace in troubled areas of the world, reduces potential threats of wider war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their influence.

- Our diplomacy in troubled regions and our ability to pursue our global economic goals are strengthened by pursuing a sixth interest: broadening our ties to other nations—with China, for example, and throughout the Third World.

- The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. Peaceful gains for freedom are also steps toward stability abroad and greater security for America.

- And finally, we cannot disregard our interest in addressing environmental and other longer term global trends that can imperil our future.

Pursuit of each of these interests helps shape the kind of world we want to see. Each is important—as a part of this broader conception and because failure in one area can lead to failure in another.

Can we say that our security is more threatened by the growth of Soviet military power or by the strains we can foresee in the international economy? By the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of additional nations or by the prospect of social and political turmoil in many regions of the world?

The hard fact is that we must face each of these and other challenges simultaneously. Clearly, our interests do collide in particular circumstances. There will be no escaping the difficult task of weighing our interests against each other, moving each forward whenever possible.

Our course in the world must be defined by a mix of interests, sensibly balanced, meeting always the central imperative of national security for our country and our people. No simple slogan or single priority can answer in advance the dilemmas of the coming decade.

Nor can we define our security interests in ways that exclude any region. To do so could leave beyond the lines of our interest nations of genuine importance to our well-being or tempt others to believe that we were ceding to them new spheres of influence.

Certainly, we will always have regional priorities. As I shall discuss in more detail, by history, strategic location,

and shared values, our allies in Europe and the Far East are central to our planning, as is our hemisphere.

We have also, in recent years, responded to new dangers in a region of growing strategic importance—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Because of its present urgency and its relevance to our overall foreign policy, let me begin there.

## Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

Our first concern is the continued, illegal detention of Americans in Tehran. Rarely have our determination and our judgment been so severely tested as in our efforts to free them. We will not rest until all of our people are free. As long as their cruel torment continues, this matter will remain at the forefront of our national agenda.

We have pursued a policy of firmness and restraint. This is the most practical course consistent with our national honor and the safety of the hostages. International condemnation of Iran, and the economic measures which have raised the costs to Iran of their illegal actions, are bringing home to Iranians the fact that the holding of the hostages is harmful to their interests and to the success of their revolution. But divisions within Iran have prevented progress.

We continue to work toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The United States agreed to the U.N. commission of inquiry to hear Iran's grievances and to work for a resolution of the hostage crisis. We regret that the commission was unable to carry out its full mandate in Tehran. But we continue to support its mission. We are prepared to see its work go forward as soon as positive conditions exist.

We are reviewing again our options in the event tangible progress is not now made.

There is only one question at issue here: the illegal detention of our diplomatic personnel and American citizens, in contravention of international law and practice. We accept Iran's revolution as a fact; we do not question the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future; we do not reject Iran's desire to bring its grievances to the attention of the world. But Iran must first live up to its fundamental responsibilities for the safety, well-being, and release of the hostages.

Several broader conditions in the area also converge to demand our attention.

- One is our direct interest in the Persian Gulf region. Roughly one-quarter of the oil we import comes from this area of the world. For our allies, the proportion is higher—two-thirds in the case of

Western Europe, three-fourths for Japan. Loss of this oil would create havoc not only in the world economy but for the security of our alliances.

Our stake in the region, however, involves more than oil. Peace and stability in the area are critical to the future of our friends there and affect the broader peace. Our strength and skill in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose in the world.

- Another condition is the potential for turmoil and instability, caused by tensions between and within nations.

- A third condition is the geographic accessibility of this critical region to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increases and dramatizes the potential threat to the security of nations there and to the world's free access to natural resources and shipping routes.

That is the fact, whatever we may speculate about Soviet aims. For intentions cannot be known with certainty. Even if they could, intentions can change. Our response must be based upon Soviet capabilities and Soviet behavior. To respond firmly to these realities now is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent.

Thus we are moving to deal with a new security situation. We have increased our own naval presence there and we are working with others on access to additional air and naval facilities in the region. We are consulting with others on steps to reinforce the deterrence to any future Soviet aggression.

These steps serve an explicit and unmistakable purpose. As President Carter has said: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

We are also acting to impose a serious and sustained price for the aggression that is being committed against Afghanistan. The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, and in other areas—have two purposes.

First, by responding firmly to aggression, we seek to deter it elsewhere. To pursue business as usual in the face of aggression is to tempt new adventures or risk miscalculation.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future—to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the

need for deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. To assume that detente is divisible, that aggression need be met only when it directly threatens one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere.

Deterrence requires sacrifice. The United States is willing to bear its share. It is vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among all our allies—for the sake of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and for the sake of the public support which makes those alliances strong.

The Soviet invasion is not only a challenge to our interests but to those of our allies as well. While there should be a division of labor, it must be an equitable one.

We do not seek nor are we asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to deter the Soviets from new adventures that could produce new crises. It is important that we and our allies stand together in our condemnation of aggression.

This firm stand also serves a second purpose: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Western pressures do not stand alone. The Soviet actions have been swiftly and strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. The Soviets are facing a staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. These factors all combine to impose a continuing cost on the Soviets for their aggression.

We also support efforts to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of true neutrality and of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Let me be clear that so long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force. We see no sign of Soviet withdrawal. The evidence is of a continuing buildup.

Let me be equally clear, however, that our intention is to remove the sanctions when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan. This would include the tighter criteria we announced last week governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. However, the changes we have proposed in the list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy (COCOM), remain in place; such changes were being considered even before the invasion of Afghanistan, as nec-

essary to promote Western security interests and to reflect the state of Soviet technology.

Nor will we alter our firm position opposing participation at the Moscow Olympics. The February deadline has passed.

Our response to the immediate situation is part of our long-term strategy in the region, as we work with others toward a cooperative security framework. Our purpose is not to dominate any nation; our purpose is to help the nations of the region preserve their independence and build their strength so that they can resist domination by others.

We advance this objective in several ways.

- We are persisting in our efforts for peace in that broad region. A comprehensive settlement between Israel and her neighbors remains a paramount American goal. It would strengthen the security of Israel, to which we remain unshakably committed. It would enhance the security of Israel's neighbors and the stability of the region as a whole.

In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not directed at the other.

- We are working with the nations of the region to foster their economic progress and political stability. The conditions inviting internal disorder cannot be remedied by military force. They can be met as governments move to meet the expectations of their people in their own ways and within their own traditions.

- We are strengthening the basis for security cooperation in the region—through military assistance, through access to facilities, and through our increased presence. We have reaffirmed in these new circumstances our commitment to the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan. The nature of our economic and security assistance will depend both on Pakistan's assessment of its needs and our own resource capabilities.

- Finally, we seek to improve our relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests. Our diplomacy is grounded in support for the independence of others and respect for their traditions and concerns.

I have concentrated on our approach in this one area because of its immediate importance and because it illustrates a



more general proposition: Globally, as well as in this region, our posture must be to maintain our own and allied military strength while pursuing an active, affirmative diplomacy. Both serve the full range of our interests.

## U.S. Security

Our most fundamental interest is to maintain our security through an assured balance of military power. For more than 15 years there has been a steady growth in Soviet military programs and budgets. They have doubled their defense efforts over the past two decades. There is no sign of abatement in this trend.

During most of that same period our own efforts, in real terms, decreased. We have reversed this downward trend. For if it were to continue, the current overall balance in military forces would be dangerously altered.

The increases in defense spending that this Administration has proposed require sacrifice at a time of economic difficulty. They are sacrifices we must make now for the sake of our future security. As we proceed, we should not underestimate our existing strength. We want no dangerous miscalculations of our power or our will.

Simple U.S.-Soviet force comparisons, for example, ignore the principles of collective security that are the core of our defense strategy. On the whole, our allies make a significantly greater military contribution than Soviet allies. Combined NATO strength rests upon an economic foundation more than twice the size of that of the Warsaw Pact. And our alliances also have a fundamental cohesion that is far less certain on the Warsaw Pact side.

A fair measurement of the balance must also account for the fact that the Soviets have fully one-fourth of their ground and tactical air forces deployed along their border with China.

More broadly, our purpose in the world is in basic harmony with the deep determination of nations around the world to defend their sovereignty. A purpose in conflict with nationalism—a quest to dominate and control others—presents far more difficulties and dangers, as the Soviets are learning from the nationalists in Afghanistan.

Most important, we are moving in an orderly fashion to anticipate and remedy the potential gaps in our defenses—strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional. Our real defense programs are growing. Reinstatement of draft registration will advance our capacity for sharp

increases in military personnel should a future crisis require it.

To portray an America standing immobile in the face of growing danger may be fashionable, but it also is patently false.

Our security begins with the balance of strategic forces. The Soviet nuclear arsenal constitutes the one credible, direct threat to the continental United States. To effectively deter that danger we must have a capability for certain and appropriate retaliation to any level of attack. We must also maintain forces which are, and are perceived to be, essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, to avoid the possible military or political consequences that an imbalance might bring.

These requirements—flexible response and essential equivalence—are advanced by our programs to modernize and improve the three elements of our triad of strategic force: the MX mobile land-based missile, the Trident submarine and missile programs, and the air-launched cruise missiles for our manned bombers.

Our security is also based upon collective defense. The security of our allies is synonymous with our own.

The Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact allies, has increased its capability to mount a heavy attack, with little warning, in Europe. To counter that danger, President Carter in 1977 recommended to NATO a Long-Term Defense Program to improve allied capabilities in each of 10 vital areas ranging from air defense to maritime posture. The program was adopted in 1978. It is being implemented.

Last December in response to Soviet theater nuclear modernization, the NATO ministers agreed to a plan for modernizing our theater nuclear forces while we seek equal negotiated limits on both sides. These force improvements reflect a common perception in NATO of the growing threat to Europe—and a common determination to respond. I will not pretend that there is unanimity in the alliance on all international issues. But NATO is united on its central role, and the alliance is making progress to guarantee that its capabilities will be sufficient to meet its obligations.

We have security interests in Asia similar to those in Europe. We are committed to maintaining our strength in Asia. Our close association and alliance with Japan reflect strong economic ties and shared security interests. Our defense cooperation is expanding. Japan's self-defense forces are undergoing steady improvement. We have urged Japanese leaders to expand these programs, within the limits set by the Japanese constitution.

We attach great importance to our alliances with our ANZUS [security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] partners—Australia and New Zealand. We stand firmly behind our other security commitments in the region.

In response to the confirmed sharp buildup in North Korea, we are maintaining our strength in that area. At the same time, the strength of our South Korean ally is growing. Next year, for example, South Korean defense spending is expected to reach nearly 6% of its gross national product, compared to roughly 4% in the early 1970s.

Conclusion of a revised base agreement with the Philippines has been an important, positive development for the sustained defense of the region.

Our forces in East Asia not only reinforce our security commitments there; because of their mobility they help protect interests that we and our Asian allies share outside the immediate region, such as those in the Persian Gulf.

Our European and Asian alliances have long encompassed our major defense priorities. They do not, however, define the perimeters of our security interests. We must also be prepared to reinforce the capacity for resistance to aggression in areas beyond our alliances. Let me take a few moments to address this important question.

With an inescapable stake in the health of the international economy, we cannot idly watch vital resources fall under the control of an outside force. Our interests require that we be able and willing to help others resist challenges to their sovereignty and to counter, in particular, a growing Soviet ability to project its power.

Our ability to project our power is unsurpassed. But improvements must be made. Enhancing the mobility of our rapid deployment forces will be an important step forward. Plans for maritime prepositioning ships and a new large cargo aircraft will further strengthen our ability to respond quickly when crises occur.

The confidence of our friends and our political influence in the world depend, in part, upon our military strength and our will to use it if necessary. We must be seen as fully reliable. Our strength must be perceived as fully sufficient to meet realistic threats.

Certainly there are limits to what we can and should do. We would undermine the confidence of our friends and allies through bellicose pronouncements or a



posture that implied an interest in dominating other sovereign states. The use of American military force is not a desirable American policy response to the purely internal politics of other nations. As the President said in his State of the Union address, "... our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being."

No easy formula can determine in advance when we should use military force beyond our alliance areas. The proper response in each case must be a function of the importance and immediacy of the American and allied interests at risk; the source and character of the threat; the potential involvement of friends and allies within and beyond the region affected; the prospects for success and the potential costs of our involvement; and other factors.

Our system rightly gives responsibility to both the President and the Congress for committing our military forces to combat. To sustain such a commitment requires a firm public base.

Obviously, direct military involvement is not our preference. The best answer to outside pressure is indigenous strength. Sensible programs of security assistance and arms supply can help our friends build their own capacity to resist. A policy which concentrated solely on our own military strength and failed to provide for legitimate security needs of our friends would be worse than shortsighted. It would be dangerous. For such a policy would increase the danger of conflicts and international confrontations that might be avoided if local security balances are preserved.

Let me emphasize that if we shortchange our programs of security assistance now, we will be shortchanging our own future safety. Such programs are not gifts to other nations; they are investments which serve our security interests as well as theirs.

### East-West Relations

As we fulfill the needs of defense and deterrence, our second interest is in fashioning a relationship with the Soviet Union in which our fundamental competition is bounded by restraint. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their adventurism in Africa and Asia have done real damage to this relationship and to the immediate prospects for a more peaceful world.

We are prepared to impose costs on aggression for as long as necessary. We will promote America's interests and values in all of our dealings. But we seek no

cold war, no indiscriminate confrontation. It is not in our interest, even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation. Even if we could discount the direct implications of an unbounded competition for our own interests—and we cannot—our relations with our allies and our credibility throughout the world would still call for a diligent, good faith American effort to sustain a framework for peace.

Thus, even as we have responded to Soviet aggression, we have also held to our formal obligations. We are denying specific benefits to the Soviet Union; but we have not abrogated formal agreements. Progress has been suspended; but when Soviet behavior allows, the door to a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship—a competition bounded by restraint and a regard for each other's interests—will be open.

Meanwhile, we should avoid framing our discussions of East-West relations in ways that suggest a false choice between extremes: between some utopian state of perfect detente on the one hand or, on the other, a condition of implacable hostility. In fact, realism and safety require that we conduct relations in the continuum between those two poles. At times there will be greater progress in areas of mutual interest. At others, as now, the adversarial elements in our relations will be prominent. There will always be elements of both.

In seeking to deter further aggression and pressing for an end to the invasion of Afghanistan, we are working to create the conditions that will enable us to return to building a more stable relationship.

### Arms Control

A third and related area of emphasis is arms control. Our interests have been well served by the arms control agreements to which the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. In 1963 we halted poisonous nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the number of offensive strategic missiles when the Soviets were building up in that area and we were not. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty headed off a potentially costly and destabilizing arms race in these defensive weapons. In the same fashion, the SALT II Treaty would serve this country's paramount security interests.

We must all think through very care-

fully the consequences of a no-SALT world. What would that world look like?

- Without SALT, there would be no agreed limit on the number of strategic systems the Soviets could build. They could easily reach a total of 3,000 delivery systems over the next 5 years, more than 700 beyond what the treaty allows.

- Without SALT, there would be no limits on the number of separate warheads each missile can carry. Each of the Soviet Union's heaviest missiles—the SS-18s—could theoretically deliver 20 or even 30 nuclear warheads, instead of the 10 the treaty allows. On those 308 SS-18s alone, the Soviets could mount as many additional warheads as their entire strategic force holds today.

- Without SALT, our own defense planning would be seriously complicated. For example, the MX program would be more difficult to design and build and less certain to achieve its purpose.

- Without the treaty, our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—could be impaired, since there would be no constraints on the deliberate concealment of those forces.

- Without the treaty, the likely increase in Soviet strategic capabilities would compel further defense expenditures that could compound our already difficult budget choices.

The security advantages of SALT II have been reinforced by recent events. At a time of increased tensions between the superpowers, effective mutual constraints on strategic arms become all the more important.

For these compelling reasons of security, we should move ahead with ratification at the earliest feasible time. In the interim, it is most important that both sides continue to observe the mutual constraints of SALT I and SALT II. Our own strategic programs are consistent with those agreements. We will, of course, continue to review our strategic arms requirements with the Congress, and we will keep a close watch on Soviet actions to see that they are exercising a similar degree of restraint.

For the same reasons, we will continue wherever feasible to pursue balanced and verifiable arms control agreements at other levels—in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, on anti-satellite warfare, on banning nuclear weapons tests, on chemical warfare, and in other areas. The theater nuclear forces negotiating offer remains on the table. And we have called upon the Soviet Union to pursue it with us.

None of these efforts is undertaken as a favor to others; each one serves the national security interests of the United States, as well as others.

Our willingness to seek restraint in strategic weapons reinforces other critical arms control efforts. In particular, we must be concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons. The technology is losing its mystery. Six countries have already carried out nuclear explosions. At least a dozen more could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so. The risks in this progression are self-evident. Regional nuclear arms races have become a real danger. The presence of nuclear arms in volatile areas multiplies the chance that they will be used.

Thus, we continue to press for the widest adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. We are urging others to take necessary steps to bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into full force. And we vigorously support the improvement and application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In 1977 President Carter also initiated the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, to involve both producing and consuming nations in a joint search for ways to realize the benefits of nuclear power while limiting the risks that nuclear weapons will be developed. This was not a negotiation that resolved all differences; it was a technical study that illuminated problems and possible solutions.

It has provided a better understanding of the economics, technology, and risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and it produced consensus on a number of middle-range goals. These include the possible value of an international regime to manage excess plutonium, stronger fuel supply assurances for consumers under effective non-proliferation controls, and conversion of research reactors from use of highly enriched uranium fuels. Differences remain in many areas. But the essential task has been advanced by this common effort.

More countries will approach the nuclear weapons threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to develop safer ways to address legitimate energy needs is slipping away. Our nonproliferation efforts are more vital now than ever before.

### **Energy Crisis and the World Economy**

Fourth, it is plainly in our interest to act now to forestall a future energy disaster. For, quite simply, that is what we could face. We now import some 40% of the

petroleum we use. This year alone, the bill for these imports will come to some \$90 billion. That energy dependence fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. It drains our balance of payments. It increases our vulnerability.

As much as anything else we do in the coming decade, our effort to gain control of our energy future—to conserve, to expand our own production, and to develop new and renewable fuels—will determine not only the quality of our lives at home but the strength of our position in the world.

We must also recognize the profound consequences of the global energy crisis for other consuming nations whose economic health affects our own. Our allies are even more dependent than we on the production and pricing decisions of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and on political events in oil producing nations.

The point is vividly illustrated by the plight of Turkey, which now spends 70-80% of all its export earnings to pay for oil imports. Because of a shortage of fuel, it is only able to keep its industry functioning at something less than 50% of capacity. It would be hard to exaggerate the strains that the energy crisis places on many nations such as this democratic and strategically placed ally.

The developing countries are even more burdened by the rising price of oil, the inflation it helps to fuel, and the debts it brings. This year, developing countries will spend on oil and debt servicing alone three times what they will receive in outside economic assistance from all the industrial democracies and the OPEC countries.

The United States has a direct stake in the economic vitality of developing countries. They are increasingly important as partners in trade—both as markets and sources of supply. And the political effect of their economic stagnation can have serious consequences for us—with major social disruptions, a reversal of progress toward democratic rule and human rights, and new openings for violence and radicalism.

In short, our economy and ultimately our security depend upon whether we can gain control over our own energy future, and whether the world economy can manage the hard transition ahead. We have made some progress in the past few years. While our economy was growing last year, our oil consumption declined. The elements of a national energy policy are taking shape.

Continued progress at home will give impetus to our international efforts—working with other consumers for more stringent conservation and developing new energy resources through World Bank financing and our bilateral assistance.

As we grapple with the energy problem, it is important that we not lose sight of our broader economic interests or jeopardize the real progress that has been made in the past few years to open and strengthen the international economy.

Despite the persistence of protectionist impulses in times of economic difficulty, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations was able to agree upon significant reductions in barriers to trade—a result which both improves our access to foreign markets and helps to curb inflation at home. Current economic strains must not erode this major achievement.

The global economic structure is being strengthened in other ways—through negotiation of commodity agreements, progress on the common fund, and more funding for the multilateral development banks.

The International Monetary Fund, in particular, has a key role in helping countries through this time of adjustment and also in recycling OPEC's enormous surpluses. To fulfill these vital missions, the increase in IMF quotas scheduled for later this year is essential. We also have a stake in assuring the necessary capital for the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the regional development banks.

Let there be no mistake. The years ahead will be trying ones for the international economy. The trend in oil prices is alarming. The OPEC countries will continue to run massive surpluses—estimated at over \$100 billion for 1980—which means corresponding deficits for other nations. The developing countries will be hardest hit—and faced with the painful choice between stunted growth and deeper debt.

The steps we have taken only buy us more time. We must use that time to make fundamental adjustments in our energy consumption and production patterns. Our older industries must be streamlined and retooled to meet the inevitable challenge of a more open and competitive world economy. More investment must be earmarked for new product lines and advanced technology. For that is necessary to restore the balance in international commerce—and to assure future prosperity for the American people.

## Regional Peace

A fifth element in our global strategy is to help achieve peaceful resolutions of disputes in troubled regions of the world. The task is an imposing one, and it is not without costs. It is always difficult to work for accommodations which cannot fully satisfy the demands of any side, because they must be accepted by all sides. We must be prepared for frustration.

But working for peace is directly relevant to our interests in collective security and the freedom of other nations from outside domination. Regional conflicts pose the danger of wider confrontations. Disputes between our allies—as in the case of Greece and Turkey—weakens the common defense. And as a magnet draws iron, Third World conflict seems to draw the interest of the Soviets, the Cubans, or others prepared to exploit disorder.

We can take satisfaction that real progress in the pursuit of peace has been made.

The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt is an historic achievement. We have no more urgent diplomatic priority than the effort to complete and broaden that peace so that Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people will be able to live securely and with dignity.

Our immediate attention must be on the autonomy negotiations. Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations] has worked hard and ably to focus and accelerate the talks, which have now begun to center on the substantive issues that lie at the very heart of the negotiations—issues like security, water, and land. We have no illusion about the complexity and sensitivity of the problems that remain. But in this evolutionary process we have overcome seemingly intractable obstacles before.

The President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to Washington for talks in April. They know that the Camp David process provides the best opportunity in 30 years to bring the security of peace to the Middle East. We cannot let it slip away.

There has also been an historic breakthrough in southern Africa. The nation of Zimbabwe will soon become a reality, through the realism of the parties, the skill of British diplomacy, the commitment of other African states, and because of the constructive role played by the United States. The steadfastness of the Congress in resisting attempts to lift sanctions prematurely played a significant part in assuring that bargaining and

balloting, not bullets, are shaping Rhodesia's future.

I want to be sure the importance of this event is understood. We have a wide range of interests in Africa—security interests, economic interests, an interest in political cooperation on all global issues. In my judgment no policy could have served those interests better than our stalwart support for the principle of majority rule, with minority rights, in Rhodesia. And nothing could have weakened us more there than to waver in this crucial effort.

Peace and stability are at risk in other parts of the world—in the eastern Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, in northwest Africa, in our own hemisphere. All of those cases have some bearing upon American interests. At the same time there are, of course, practical limits on what we—or any one nation—can do.

The nature of our involvement will vary—from support for the efforts of others, to mediation ourselves, to helping maintain a balance of forces if that is required to induce the parties to settle. But in each case we are determined to employ the influence we have to develop workable alternatives to war.

We advance regional peace in another tangible way, by striving to limit the destructiveness of war when it cannot be prevented. Since 1977 the United States has taken the lead in working toward negotiated limits on conventional arms transfers. While we remain convinced that such agreements can contribute to a safer world, we do not at this time foresee progress.

In the absence of agreed international restraint, we do not plan to reduce further the ceiling on our own arms transfers. But the other elements of our arms transfer policy continue to serve our interests. Arms transfers must be based on assessments of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The policy has a dual effect:

- To facilitate those arms transfers that clearly promote the security of the United States and our allies and friends, and
- To restrain transfers that are in excess of legitimate defense needs, that could promote regional arms races or increase instability, or that otherwise do not advance U.S. interests.

In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security, not profit.

## Positive Bilateral Relations

Sixth, we have an interest in building positive bilateral relations with all countries, wherever there is a basis of shared concerns. Scores of new countries—and

new centers of power—have emerged since the end of the Second World War. The international landscape—and thus the nature of diplomacy—has been altered fundamentally. Questions of direct importance to us are determined not in a few capitals but among 155. Our access to resources and to defense facilities cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed. We seek positive relations around the world not because we have a compulsion to be liked but because our interests and the well-being of our people are at stake.

This interest in a broad network of relationships is reflected in our international approach:

- This Administration has worked especially hard to strengthen our core partnerships with our traditional allies. If there appear to be new strains among us, they flow principally from the fact that we are facing up to hard, new challenges together.

- We often have an interest in working with nations whose ideologies are different from ours. In a diverse world our exact scale of values will be replicated rarely if at all. It would make no sense to limit our influence by refusing to pursue specific areas of shared interest with other nations because of broader disagreement.

This is why we oppose, in principle, country-by-country limitations on our aid and trade programs. Obviously we will not have such relationships when there is not yet a basis for cooperation—as is now the case in Cuba and Vietnam. But our diplomacy is undercut when such restrictions are cast in law.

The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China illustrates the value of an open approach. It is, in its own terms, an accomplishment of historic importance—an achievement of economic as well as diplomatic meaning, global as well as regional significance. Normalization is not an end in itself. It is the beginning of continuing efforts to improve our relations with Beijing. Similarly, we are working toward improved relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

- The pursuit of our interests also requires that we stress an inclusive form of diplomacy, in which all who have a stake also have a role and are encouraged to accept a share of the responsibility for hard decisions. Our diplomacy on Namibia and Zimbabwe is a case in point. Such multilateral efforts are time-consuming and complex. But building co-



alitions is a process that Americans, with our own pluralistic traditions, well understand. Abroad, no less than at home, on many issues it is the only way to achieve workable results.

Our interest does not require that others be like us or always side with us. We seek their willingness to find areas of mutual interest or balanced compromise when our interests may clash. A quest for uniformity is not realistic, nor is it required. The Soviets may demand ideological purity; we can serve our interests in a world of diversity.

In this context, let me dispute the suggestion that in our dealings with the Third World we have to choose between two approaches: competing with Soviet ambitions in the Third World by seeing the developing nations primarily through an East-West prism or dealing with the Third World primarily in terms of Third World problems. These are sometimes presented as exclusive options.

But the choice presented—between an interest in Third World concerns and a determination to counter Soviet inroads—is false. In fact, the two are twin strands in a single strategy. For the best strategy for competing with the Soviets is to address the practical interests of Third World countries themselves, not only their security concerns but their goals of economic and political justice as well.

It would be misleading, of course, to gloss over our real differences with developing countries on a wide range of issues. But we can bargain most effectively, to our mutual benefit, when they are confident that we share the goals of equitable economic growth and political independence.

Certainly there have been painful disappointments and setbacks. But because we have supported those goals, our relations with most of the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are better than they have been for many years.

## Human Rights

The seventh way in which we advance our interests in the world—indeed our long-term security—is through support for human rights. When the two concepts—human rights and national security—are uttered in the same breath, it is often to express an unavoidable conflict, a fundamental tension between the pursuit of the good and the pursuit of the practical.

I strongly reject the idea that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of self-interest. By this, I do not mean to say that there can never be a conflict between human rights concerns and security concerns. We cannot escape the hard decisions that must be made in such cases. We must constantly weigh how best to encourage the advancement of human rights while maintaining our ability to conduct essential business with governments—even unpopular ones—in countries where we have important security interests.

But the fact remains that over the longer term, our pursuit of human rights is not only generally compatible with our national security—it contributes to that security.

We know from our own national experience that the drive for human freedom has tremendous force and vitality. It is universal. It is resilient. And, ultimately, it is irrepressible. Just in the past several years, we have seen that drive for a fuller voice in economic and political life gain new expression in Portugal and Spain and Greece; in Nigeria and Ghana and Upper Volta; in Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic; and elsewhere. These countries make a compelling case for the proposition that the tide in the world is running toward human rights and that it is in our interest to support it.

The United States cannot claim credit for these developments. But we can find proof in them that our policy of furthering human rights is not only consistent with American ideals. It is consistent with the aspirations of others.

Our support for those aspirations enables us to regain the political high ground in competition for world influence. It stands in vivid contrast to the practices of the Soviet Union abroad, as Afghanistan demonstrates, and at home, as the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov again makes clear. In short, our willingness to press for human rights progress gives credibility to our commitment to freedom. And it is that commitment which has always been one of America's most enduring strengths in the world.

Our support for human rights serves our interests in another way. As President Carter put it in his State of the Union address,

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

As the President suggested, divergent views cannot be long repressed without sowing the seeds of violent convulsion. And once the ties are broken between a government and its people, outside intervention cannot secure its long-term survival. Thus it is profoundly in our national interest to support constructive change before such ties erode and the alternatives of radicalism or repression drive out moderate solutions.

How each society manages change is a matter for it to decide. We cannot and should not write social contracts for others. But we can help others promote—in their own ways—peaceful and orderly reform.

We do that by clearly expressing our opposition to official torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses of individual liberties. Whatever short-term quiet they may provide, they engender long-term bitterness.

We do it by reinforcing efforts to open economic and political institutions to broader national participation, so that they are better able to accommodate conflicting views and interests.

And we do it by focusing development assistance on helping governments meet the basic human needs of their people. In doing our part to meet the greatest moral challenge of our times—the plight of hundreds of millions of human beings who lack adequate food or health care—we are also addressing the root causes of instability. We must recognize, in the demand of these people for their basic human rights, that stability can only come through peaceful progress, not through a desperate effort to preserve the status quo.

Nowhere do we see more clearly the race between radical and peaceful change than in Central America today. And nowhere is our commitment to peaceful change more clearly tested. In Nicaragua our challenge is to join with others in the region to help the Nicaraguan people and government succeed in building a stable, healthy, democratic society out of the debris of dictatorship and civil war. We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold there. But if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can help guarantee that democracy will fail.

Failure to appropriate needed American aid has jeopardized our interests. It has weakened the position of the private sector, which would receive the majority of our assistance. It has made it more dif-

ficult for the Nicaraguan Government to pursue a development strategy that includes important roles for both the public and private sectors. And it has played into the hands of the Cubans. Those who are most concerned about the potential for radical revolution in Latin America and growing Cuban influence in the region should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to help Nicaragua build a better future.

Our essential challenge in El Salvador is similar. In October reformist military officers overthrew a military dictator in order to forestall the outbreak of a violent and bloody civil war. The Revolutionary Junta of Government, which includes the Christian Democratic Party, is committed to peaceful, sweeping change. An impressive agrarian reform has already turned more than 224,000 hectares of land over to the rural poor. The ultimate success of the program will depend heavily on our ability to provide technical and economic assistance.

The dangers of the situation are clear in the tragic and despicable assassination of Archbishop Romero. If reform fails, El Salvador will become a battleground between the radical left and the radical right. A moderate solution is still possible. It is in our interest. We will pursue this interest by helping the Government of El Salvador pursue progress.

In short, we pursue our human rights objectives, not only because they are right but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests coincide.

### Environmental Concerns

Eighth and finally, we cannot define our interests so narrowly as to exclude from our immediate attention a series of other global trends that darken the horizon. We face a world population that could double in the next generation, overwhelming our global resources; already, for example, the world's tropical forests are disappearing at a rate of 50 acres a minute. The worldwide flood of refugees displaced from their homes—some 7-8 million people today—is growing. The enormous international traffic in narcotics costs our society nearly \$50 billion each year and destroys thousands of lives. The mounting wave of international terrorism strikes at the very heart of civilized order.

Imagine for a moment how different

our world could be for our children if we do not address these problems now on an urgent basis. To relegate these matters permanently to the back burner of our foreign policy is to invite even more serious consequences for us in the future.

- Thus we have increased our bilateral aid commitment in family planning. The United States is the world's leading donor in this area.

- We have focused greater attention and greater resources on efforts to deal with such potentially harmful environmental trends as the shrinking global base of tropical forests and farmland and the creeping spread of deserts.

- The United States has taken a leading role in relief and resettlement of refugees, particularly in Southeast Asia where the need has been most acute. Humanitarian considerations alone would compel our generous response. Our political and strategic interests reinforce that requirement. For massive refugee flows heighten tensions in regions already unsettled by political and military conflict. We must help friendly governments which are risking severe internal strains as they shoulder a growing refugee burden.

- Wherever possible, we have strengthened our bilateral cooperation with governments striving to halt the production of narcotics within their borders.

The steps that we take now to address such global issues can prevent our being engulfed by them later. But let me make a fundamental point here: On these—and on many of the other challenges I have discussed this morning—there can be no exclusively American solutions. There can only be international answers, or there will be no answers at all.

The blight of terrorism is an especially urgent case in point. No nation can defeat it alone. We have been working actively through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to build an international consensus on the criminality of terrorist tactics. International conventions—on aircraft sabotage, hijacking, the protection of diplomats, and against the taking of hostages—play a crucial part. We need wider support for the principles that governments should not give in to terrorist blackmail and that both those who commit and those who support terrorism have to be punished. Every feasible step—unilateral and multilateral—must be employed.

In this and many other areas, the truth is that we cannot assure our future

security without a framework for global cooperation on issues that affect many nations and many peoples. That is why we have welcomed and supported the growing strength of regional associations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Association of South East Asian Nations.

And that is why we need to support, and continue to help strengthen, the United Nations and its affiliated institutions. It is a center of global politics. The collective expression of world opinion embodied in recent U.N. votes on Afghanistan and Iran demonstrates that our interests can be advanced there. In the Middle East and elsewhere its peacekeeping operations reduce tensions. On refugees; on the fight against hunger, illiteracy, and disease; on strengthening international resistance to terrorism; and on other issues of importance to us, the United Nations is making a concrete contribution.

Certainly, there are limits to what international organizations can accomplish. But to dismiss them as irrelevant or inconsequential would be folly. The simple fact is that we need them and they need our support. The institutions of international cooperation and international law are essential to the practical advance of our interests in the world.

### Conclusion

I know that no one is more acutely aware of the breadth and complexity of our challenges than the members of this committee. We face a broad agenda. It requires constant, hard choices among compelling yet competing interests. In a dangerous world, it requires a willingness to defend our vital interests with force when necessary and a diplomacy of active and constructive engagement to reduce the dangers we may confront. It requires sacrifice in resources for our defense and help for other nations, in reduced consumption of energy, and efforts to control inflation. It will test our wisdom and our persistence.

We will be badly served if we fail to understand a world of rapid change and shy away from its complexity. The flat truth is that complex problems can seldom be resolved by simple solutions.

Some have said that we are trying to

do too much. I say that we cannot afford to do less, in our own national interest.

Some say that in trying to do too much, we have accomplished too little. I say that in strengthening our military posture, in reemphasizing and strengthening NATO, in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, in normalizing relations with China, in helping achieve peace between Israel and Egypt and a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, in advancing peace in Zimbabwe, in the Panama Canal treaties, in the successful multilateral trade negotiations and other improvements in the international economic system, in closer ties to developing nations, and in promoting human rights—in all these areas, I say we are on the right road, even if it is a long and difficult one.

Some say that in seeking peaceful change toward human justice in every area of the world, we encourage radicalism. I say that the world is changing, that human beings everywhere will demand a better life. The United States must offer its own vision of a better future, or the future will belong to others.

Some have said that the executive and legislative branches cannot collaborate effectively on foreign policy. I say that the record over the past few years has been a good one.

Some say that America is in a period of decline. I am convinced they are wrong.

There is no question that the years to come present a somber prospect. Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and beyond, energy crisis, revolutionary explosions when expectations run ahead of progress—such current events are all too likely to be harbingers of the trends of the coming decade. This is the reality we confront.

But it is also a reality that our strengths—military, economic, and political—give us an unmatched capacity for world leadership. We can succeed, if we combine power with determination, persistence, and patience. We can make progress if we promote the full range of our interests and use the full range of our strengths. ■

---

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs • Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • March 1980 •  
Editors: Norman Howard, Harriet Culley, Colleen Sussman

*This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced; citation of this source would be appreciated.*



**NOW \$18.00  
yearly subscription**



**Formerly \$42.50  
yearly subscription**

## **What's Different About the Department of State Bulletin?**

### **A World of Difference.**

#### **Price**

If you are interested in world affairs, the BULLETIN may just be the best magazine bargain around. What other government or private publication can boast a 58% reduction in price? The BULLETIN is published monthly at a new subscription rate of \$18 per year—a saving of \$24.50 from the old rate of \$42.50.

#### **Format**

The BULLETIN has a new look featuring a modern magazine style and an attractive, illustrated cover to highlight the major articles. Traditional foreign policy articles and speeches are supported with more charts, graphs, tables, photos, and other material useful to BULLETIN readers. In addition, the new 3-column format is designed to enhance readability.

#### **Content**

After publishing as a weekly for some 39 years, the BULLETIN has become a monthly. Nevertheless, there is no reduction in the total amount of material published, thanks to the economies made possible by the 3-column format. We continue to include texts of significant foreign policy speeches, statements, and news conferences of the President, the Secretary of State, and senior Department of State officials; White House, State Department, and U.S. Mission to the U.N. press releases; and U.S. treaty actions.

Also, the BULLETIN periodically publishes special features on international affairs. Librarians, teachers, students, editors, journalists, business executives, international lawyers, and others interested in following the latest developments in international relations will find the BULLETIN essential reading. Also, filing 12 monthly issues is much simpler than filing 52 weekly copies.

---

**SUBSCRIPTION \$18.00 Domestic \$22.50 Foreign**

---

**Make checks payable to:** Superintendent of Documents,  
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

---

Name .....  
Street address .....  
City and State ..... ZIP Code.....


Bureau of Public Affairs  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Postage and Fees Paid  
Department of State  
STA-501



Official Business

Third Class Bulk Rate



3